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DEVELOPMENTS IN FREE SPEECH LAW IN AUSTRALIA:
COLEMAN AND MULHOLLAND‡
Elisa Arcioni*

This article provides an overview of the developments in 2004 regarding the
constitutional freedom of political communication.1 This will be done through a
discussion of the cases of Coleman v Power2 and Mulholland v Australian Electoral
Commission.3 These two cases have confirmed the validity of the general propositions
in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation,4 regarding the existence of a freedom of
political communication implied from the Australian Constitution, and provide the basis
for some observations with respect to that implication. In this article an overview is
given of the basic principles in Lange, followed by a detailed discussion of relevant

_____________________________________________________________________________________
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1
It should be noted that there are a number of potential sources of free speech protection in
the Australian Constitution, in addition to the implication from representative and
responsible government. These include s 92, s 116 and Chapter III of the Constitution. The
potential for ss 92 and 116 to provide protection can be seen from the text of those sections.
The potential for Chapter III to do so is the subject of APLA Ltd v Legal Services
Commissioner of NSW, heard by the High Court on 5, 6 October and 7 December 2004,
judgment reserved. On the basis of the submissions made to the Court in that case, it is
predicted that an implication regarding freedom of communication may emerge from
Chapter III of the Constitution. In brief, Chapter III may protect some speech by requiring
'that the people of the Commonwealth have the capacity, the ability, if you like the
freedom, to ascertain their legal rights and to assert their legal rights to approach the courts
… the freedom to communicate, that is fundamentally to receive such information and
assistance as may be practically necessary for that to occur': Transcript of Proceedings,
APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner of NSW (High Court of Australia, Mr Gageler SC, 5
October 2004).
2
(2004) 209 ALR 182 ('Coleman').
3
(2004) 209 ALR 582 ('Mulholland').
4
(1997) 189 CLR 520 ('Lange').
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parts of the judgments in Coleman and Mulholland.5 This article ends with analysis of
some of the issues raised by the cases.

I

LANGE AND SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES

The orthodox starting point for a discussion of the protection of free speech in the
Constitution seems to be Lange.6 Lange followed the decisions of Australian Capital
Television Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth7 and Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills,8 in which a
majority of the High Court recognised an implied freedom of political communication
in the Constitution. Unlike the earlier cases, Lange was a unanimous decision of the
High Court. It arose in the circumstances of alleged defamation through the broadcast
of a 'Four Corners' television programme by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation.
Lange, the then New Zealand Prime Minister, alleged that the broadcast conveyed
imputations that, inter alia, he was unfit to hold public office. The High Court
responded by applying the implied freedom, which had been accepted in ACTV and
Nationwide News, to the facts and extended the defamation defence of qualified
privilege to be consistent with that constitutional imperative. The matter was remitted
to the Supreme Court of NSW. Decided in 1997, Lange confirmed that the Constitution,
through its text and structure, established a system of representative and responsible
government.9 Due to the constitutional nature of that system, the Constitution therefore
also requires that there be freedom of some types of communication, as necessary to
maintain that system. That is, the system of government prescribed by the Constitution
cannot exist without people having the freedom to communicate on matters
governmental and political, or else the people could not inform themselves and each
other about potential and actual representatives, nor could the representatives be
'responsible' to the people.
The validity of the restriction placed on the freedom, namely the law of defamation,
was determined by the often-quoted test adopted in the case:
First, does the law effectively burden freedom of communication about government or
political matters either in its terms, operation or effect? Secondly, if the law effectively
burdens that freedom, is the law reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a
legitimate end the fulfilment of which is compatible with the maintenance of the
constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible government and the
procedure prescribed by s 128 [of the Constitution] for submitting a proposed amendment
of the Constitution to the informed decision of the people … If the first question is
answered 'yes' and the second is answered 'no', the law is invalid.10
_____________________________________________________________________________________
5
This article focuses only on the free speech aspect of the judgments. It does not address all
the legal issues arising from the cases.
6
This article does not address the history of the development of the ideas in Lange. For cases
preceding Lange see: Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR
106; Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1; Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times
Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104 ('Theophanous'); Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd (1994) 182
CLR 211.
7
(1992) 177 CLR 106 ('ACTV').
8
(1992) 177 CLR 1 ('Nationwide News').
9
Sections 1, 7, 8, 13, 24, 25, 28 and 30 were referred to as the font of this constitutionallyprescribed system of government: Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 557. See also ss 6, 49, 62, 64, 83,
128: Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 557–9.
10
Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567–8 (footnotes omitted).
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Further basic principles were consolidated in Lange. The freedom of communication
is negative, in the sense that it is an immunity from government action (including
legislative and executive actions and the common law). It is not positive in the sense of
a right enforceable directly against people or institutions which burden the freedom.
The remedy for any infringement of the freedom is a challenge to the validity of
legislation, executive action, or a challenge to the interpretation of the common law.
The freedom is not absolute, as it does not protect all forms of communication at all
times and in all circumstances.
Although there have been consistent critics of Lange (both judicial11 and
academic12), the Court has not disturbed its basic principles, outlined above, although
it has given more consideration to what speech falls within the area of protection, what
constitutes a 'burden' on that speech and how the standard of review is to be
considered and applied. That exploration will be considered in the context of the
Coleman and Mulholland cases.13

II

COLEMAN

Background
Coleman arises from a somewhat more earthy set of facts than Lange. Patrick Coleman
has a history of protesting in Townsville, Queensland, with numerous charges against
him. On the occasion related to this case he was in Townsville Mall, railing against
allegedly corrupt policemen. Coleman was distributing pamphlets with the following
words on them:
Ah ha! Constable Brendan Power and his mates, this one was a beauty - sitting outside
the mall police beat in protest at an unlawful arrest - with simple placards saying
TOWNSVILLE COPS - A GOOD ARGUMENT FOR A BILL OF RIGHTS - AND DEAR
MAYOR - BITE ME - AND TOWNSVILLE CITY COUNCIL THE ENEMY OF FREE
SPEECH - the person was saying nothing just sitting there talking to an old lady then
BAMMM arrested dragged inside and detained. Of course not happy with the kill, the
cops - in eloquent prose having sung in unison in their statements that the person was
running through the mall like a madman belting people over the head with a flag pole
before the dirty hippie bastard assaulted and [sic] old lady and tried to trip her up with
the flag while ... while ... he was having a conversation with her before the cops scared

_____________________________________________________________________________________
11
Justice Dyson Heydon, 'Judicial Activism and the Death of the Rule of Law' (2003) 47
Quadrant 9, 17. After delivery of the speech reprinted in the above article, Heydon J was
appointed to the High Court. He is a member of the Court which decided the cases
discussed in this article. Callinan J has similarly been critical of the Lange decision — see
Roberts v Bass (2002) 212 CLR 1, 101–2 [285], where he refers to his earlier reasons in
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 330–2
[338].
12
See, eg, Adrienne Stone, 'The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure: Standards of
Review and the Freedom of Political Communication' (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law
Review 668.
13
I will not be addressing other relevant High Court cases decided since Lange, such as Levy v
Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579 ('Levy'), Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1 ('Kruger'),
Roberts v Bass (2002) 212 CLR 1, or cases in lower courts such as Jones v Scully (2002) 120
FCR 243.
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her off ... boys boys boys, I got witnesses so KISS MY ARSE YOU SLIMY LYING
BASTARDS.14

When two police officers (including Constable Power) approached Coleman to
arrest him, he said, amongst other things, '[t]his is Constable Brendan Power a corrupt
police officer'.15 As a result of his communications outlined above, Coleman was
charged with offences under the Vagrants, Gaming and Other Offences Act 1931 (Qld)
('Vagrants Act')16 of distributing material with insulting words (s 7A(1)(c)) and using
insulting words in public (s 7(1)(d)). Due to the violent circumstances surrounding
Coleman's arrest, he was also charged with obstructing police, serious assault against
police and wilful damage.
At trial, Coleman was found guilty of all charges except that of wilful damage.
Coleman unsuccessfully appealed to the District Court. In the Queensland Court of
Appeal, Coleman was successful only in relation to the charge arising from the
distribution of printed material containing insulting words, through a decision that
s7A(1)(c) was invalid as it infringed the implied freedom of political communication
established in Lange.17 Coleman, self-represented, was then granted special leave to
appeal the remaining charges of using insulting words, obstructing police and
assaulting police, in the High Court. A majority (McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and
Kirby JJ) allowed the appeal in relation to the charge of using insulting words. All of
the Court except McHugh J dismissed the appeal regarding the remaining charges that
arose from the circumstances of Coleman's arrest.
Therefore, although in the end Coleman was not guilty of either of the charges
relating to his communications made in the Townsville Mall (including the one being
challenged before the High Court), he was penalised for the way he reacted to his
arrest made as a result of those communications. The decision with respect to the
consequential charges will be outlined before returning to focus on the primary issue
for the purpose of this article — the application of the Lange test to the insulting words
legislation.
The appellant had argued that the arrest was unlawful because the insulting words
charge (which prompted the purported arrest) was based on invalid legislation.
Therefore, the appellant's actions in resisting the police attempts to restrain and arrest
him (which actions constituted the basis for the remaining charges) were justified, so
the charges of obstructing police and assaulting police should also be dismissed. The
relevant law at the focus of this argument was with respect to police powers of arrest,
namely, s 35(1) of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 1997 (Qld). It relevantly
provided: 'It is lawful for a police officer … to arrest a person the police officer
reasonably suspects has committed or is committing an offence'. McHugh J concluded
_____________________________________________________________________________________
14
Reproduced in Coleman (2004) 209 ALR 182, 195 [42] (McHugh J).
15
Ibid 195 [37] (McHugh J).
16
This Act was repealed by the Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld), the operative provisions of
which commenced on 21 March 2005. The Explanatory Notes to the Summary Offences Bill
2004 (Qld) state: 'Many of the provisions of the Vagrants Gaming and Other Offences Act 1931
were so outdated that they were no longer suitable for enforcement in today's society': at 1.
No specific mention is made with respect to the insulting language provisions of the
Vagrants Act. However, similar offences are retained in the guise of prohibitions on public
nuisance: see Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld) s 6.
17
See Coleman v P [2002] 2 Qd R 620.
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that s 7(1)(d) of the Vagrants Act was invalid, that therefore the police could not have
had 'a reasonable suspicion that an offence has been committed'18 so the arrest was
unlawful and the remaining charges had to be dismissed. In contrast, a majority of the
Court concluded that the Vagrants Act was valid (albeit more limited in operation than
the police had assumed, to the extent that Coleman's activities did not fall within it)
and therefore the issue of the powers of arrest did not arise,19 and the other charges
remained.
Prohibition on using insulting words in public
The focus of this analysis of Coleman is the application of the Lange test to the primary
legislation in the case — s 7(1)(d) of the Vagrants Act. However, a significant caveat in
this discussion is that concessions were made by the parties to the effect that Lange was
valid, that it applied to the case and that the first limb of the Lange test (that the law
burdened the freedom) was satisfied on the facts.20 The Court accepted these
concessions and made it clear that they did not decide the issues conceded,21 although
some of the judges agreed with the concessions.22 There was a diversity of views as to
the legitimacy of making such concessions. McHugh J stated that parties can
legitimately concede issues before the Court,23 while Kirby J disagreed, but noted that
the concessions made no difference to his conclusion as he found them to be correct.24
Despite the position of the parties, all the justices addressed the Lange issue. Although
some of that discussion may be obiter, it nevertheless provides an indication of the
thinking of the current Court.
McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ all read down the legislation to such an
extent that it did not apply to Coleman's activities. Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ
restricted its application to circumstances where the words were 'either intended to
provoke unlawful physical retaliation, or were reasonably likely to do so'.25 The
justices applied a process of statutory interpretation informed by the Constitution.
McHugh J came to the same ultimate conclusion that the legislation did not apply to
Coleman, but by a different route. McHugh J found the legislation was invalid by
virtue of the application of the Lange test, that the end to be achieved by the legislation
was legitimate but that the means by which it was to be achieved were not. That is, that
an unqualified prohibition against insulting language was not justified.26 His Honour
found the legislation invalid 'to the extent that it penalised insulting words uttered in
discussing or raising matters concerning politics and government in or near public

_____________________________________________________________________________________
18
Coleman (2004) 209 ALR 182, 217 [140] (emphasis in original).
19
Ibid 193 [34] (Gleeson CJ), 231 [204] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), 249 [266] (Kirby J), 260 [303]
(Callinan J), 270 [337] (Heydon J).
20
Heydon J noted that 'the Attorney-General for New South Wales disputed [the concession],
but "operated on the basis" of it': ibid 264 [317], fn 325.
21
Ibid 191 [26], 193 [33] (Gleeson CJ), 203–4 [80]–[81] (McHugh J), 230 [197] (Gummow and
Hayne JJ), 239 [232] (Kirby J), 255 [289] (Callinan J), 264 [318] (Heydon J).
22
Ibid 202 [74] (McHugh J), 234 [214] (Kirby J).
23
Ibid 203 [79].
24
Ibid 239 [231]–[232].
25
Ibid 227 [183] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), with Kirby J agreeing: at 238 [226].
26
Ibid 210 [105].
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places.'27 He therefore read down the legislation so that it did not cover such
communication, with the consequence that Coleman's activities did not fall within its
scope. The other justices (Gleeson CJ, Callinan and Heydon JJ) disagreed with the
interpretations of the legislation given by the majority justices28 and held the
legislation valid and applicable to Coleman's activities.
In the process of interpreting the legislation, all of the Court (except for Callinan J29)
recognised a freedom or right of speech at common law and a principle of
interpretation protective of fundamental rights and freedoms. 'Except by necessary
implication, courts should not extend the natural and ordinary meaning of words that
create an offence, especially when the statute is regarding such a fundamental right as
that of free speech.'30 Kirby J also proposed what seem to be two related principles.31
_____________________________________________________________________________________
27
Ibid 212 [110]. Considering the lack of guidance provided by the courts in relation to what
such communication includes, the enforcement of such an interpretation would be difficult.
28
Gleeson CJ (ibid 188 [14]) limited the legislation to include 'insulting words intended or
likely to provoke a forceful response', with the qualification that:
the language in question must be not merely derogatory of the person to whom it is
addressed; it must be of such a nature that … [it] is contrary to contemporary
standards of public good order, and goes beyond what, by those standards, is
simply an exercise of freedom to express opinions on controversial issues.
Callinan J considered the touchstone of the legislation to be the avoidance of the 'risk of
provocation': at 255 [287] (emphasis in original); Heydon J adopted the 'ordinary' meaning
of the word 'insulting': at 261 [309].
29
Callinan J did not recognise a common law right or freedom as identified by the other
members of the Court but did refer to another 'valuable freedom' of peaceful passage in
another context: ibid 257 [297]. It is worth noting that the provision of the Summary Offences
Act 2005 (Qld), which is to replace the legislation at issue in Coleman, also has 'peaceful
passage' at its heart: see s 6(2)(b).
30
Coleman (2004) 209 ALR 182, 199 [65] (McHugh J). Gummow and Hayne JJ described as
'well-established principles of statutory construction' that '[o]nce it is recognised that
fundamental rights are not to be cut down save by clear words, it follows that the
curtailment of free speech by legislation directed to proscribing particular kinds of
utterances will often be read as "narrowly limited"': at 228 [188] (drawing on the US notion
that some kinds of speech fall outside the notion of free speech, but that those categories
are 'narrowly limited': at 228 [187]). See also at 227 [185] (footnotes omitted): 'The offence
which it creates restricts freedom of speech. That freedom is not, and never has been,
absolute. But in confining the limits of the freedom, a legislature must mark the boundary
it sets with clarity. Fundamental common law rights are not to be eroded or curtailed save
by clear words.' Seemingly as a separate argument, Kirby J also considered a separate
notion of 'ordinary civil rights to free expression': at 237–8 [225], 245 [250]. He outlined the
rule as follows: 'In order to be effective, a statutory provision diminishing ordinary civil
rights to free expression, otherwise recognised by the common law, must be stated clearly.
… General words … will not normally suffice' (footnote omitted). Kirby J also stated:
'Because of the common law rule that "everybody is free to do anything, subject only to the
provisions of the law", there is a general freedom of speech under the common law in so far
as it has not been lawfully restricted': at 246 [253] (footnote omitted). He added force to this
argument as follows: 'Even more clearly will this approach govern the interpretation where
the common law right in question is protected by an implied constitutional freedom, such
as that expressed in Lange': at 246 [251]. Heydon J also accepted the principle of
interpretation, but on the facts found that the word 'insulting' is not unclear: at 262 [313].
The Chief Justice took a slightly different but related approach: at 185–8 [7]–[14].
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The justices wavered between the terms 'right' and 'freedom'. Nevertheless, this
discussion of the common law's protection of speech suggests that there may be a
common law 'right' to free speech, distinct from the notion of a general 'freedom' of
speech derived from 'the common law rule that "everybody is free to do anything,
subject only to the provisions of the law"'.32
This focus on interpretation does not preclude the case being seen as a significant
one with respect to free speech in the Constitution. All the justices address the Lange test
in some form, either as a reason to affirm their interpretation of the meaning of the
legislation,33 in the context of a principle of interpretation where 'in the event of
ambiguity, a construction of legislation should be preferred which avoids
incompatibility with the Constitution',34 or in order to address the validity of the
legislation. However, it remains significant that statutory interpretation was at the core
of the judgments. This is consistent with the trend of the Court to avoid directly
addressing constitutional issues if an alternative resolution can be found, while at the
same time acknowledging the 'single system of jurisprudence'35 in Australia, whereby
the Constitution has an affect on legislation and the common law. These cases provide
yet another example of the symbiotic relationship between the Constitution and other
forms of law in Australia.36 What follows is an outline of how the Court addressed
aspects of the implied freedom in Coleman, namely, the scope of the freedom, its
application to State legislation and the standard of review to be applied.
Scope of the freedom — insults and police officers
The insulting nature of Coleman's communications and their subject matter (State
police officers) led to a discussion of whether such communication could be covered by
the freedom.
A majority37 concluded that insults could constitute political communication.
McHugh J stated that '[t]he concession that the words used by the appellant were a
communication on political or government matters was also correctly made. … Insults
are as much a part of communications concerning political and government matters as
_____________________________________________________________________________________
31
The first is that 'a construction that would arguably diminish fundamental human rights
(including as such rights are expressed in international law) should not normally be
preferred if an alternative construction is equally available that involves no such
diminution': ibid 237-8 [225]. The second is by incorporating international law or principles
in the discussion. See ibid 241–2 [240], 242 [242]; cf at 189–91 [17]–[24] (Gleeson CJ).
32
Ibid 246 [253] (Kirby J); see also Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 560.
33
See, eg, Coleman (2004) 209 ALR 182, 227 [184], 229–30 [195]–[199] (Gummow and Hayne
JJ); cf at 235–6 [219]–[221] (Kirby J).
34
Ibid 237 [225] (Kirby J).
35
John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503, 534 [66] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh,
Gummow and Hayne JJ), quoting Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 564.
36
Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law & Theory: Commentary
& Materials (3rd ed, 2002) 1249.
37
The Chief Justice (in the minority in relation to the primary charge) did not explicitly
address the issue but stated: 'Let it be accepted that his conduct was, in the broadest sense,
"political"', going on to note the problem of delimiting the scope of 'political'
communication: Coleman (2004) 209 ALR 182, 191 [28]. This problem has been noted
previously: see Theophanous (1993) 182 CLR 104, 123 (Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ);
Levy (1997) 189 CLR 579, 638 (Kirby J).
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is irony, humour or acerbic criticism.'38 He later stated that 'insults are a legitimate part
of the political discussion protected by the Constitution.'39 Gummow and Hayne JJ
seem to have agreed with this: 'Insult and invective have been employed in political
communication at least since the time of Demosthenes.'40 Kirby J also agreed,
emphasising how politics is practised in Australia.41 This should not be a surprising
conclusion by the majority, considering the relatively recent discussion by the High
Court in Roberts v Bass,42 where the Court found that it was legitimate to target an
electoral candidate's reputation in a political campaign, and in light of the Court's
previous statements regarding the combative nature of politics.43
In contrast, Callinan J rejected this argument and Heydon J seems to have hinted
against it, while not going so far as to state that insulting language and political
communication are mutually exclusive. Callinan J considered the words of Lange and
argued that 'to attract the application of the implication it is necessary that the spoken
or written communication be capable of throwing light on government or political
matters.'44 He concluded that in this situation, they did not, characterising them as
'[i]nsulting or abusive words' which may 'generate heat' but not throw light on political
issues.45 This conclusion is consistent with the emphasis in his judgment regarding
'civilized' community, suggesting that insulting language plays no part in civilised
political discourse.46 Callinan J seems to have restricted what he considers is protected
communication by stating: 'it is only reasonable conduct that the implication protects.
Threatening, insulting, or abusive language to a person in a public place is
unreasonable conduct. The implication should not extend to protect that.'47 While
some of Callinan J's discussion may be more directed to the second stage of the Lange
test (whether a law which burdens the freedom is nevertheless legitimate) and
dependent on the particular facts of the case, his position appears to be that insulting
language does not constitute relevant political communication. He disagreed with the
concession that the legislation prohibiting insulting words burdens the freedom,48 and
regarded 'the notion that [the provisions of the Act] burden the freedom of
communication on political matters in any way as far fetched.'49
Heydon J appears to have adopted a position between the majority mentioned
above and Callinan J. Heydon J stated that it was 'unsatisfactory' for the case to be
_____________________________________________________________________________________
38
Coleman (2004) 209 ALR 182, 204 [81].
39
Ibid 210 [105].
40
Ibid 230 [197].
41
Ibid 241 [238]–[239].
42
(2002) 212 CLR 1, 20–1 [39]-[42] (Gleeson CJ), 42–3 [107] (Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow
JJ), 66 [184] (Kirby J).
43
See the brief discussion and references in Elisa Arcioni, 'Politics, Police and Proportionality
– an Opportunity to Explore the Lange test: Coleman v Power' (2003) 25 Sydney Law Review
379, 382–5.
44
Coleman (2004) 209 ALR 182, 256 [291].
45
Ibid 259 [299]; cf at 230 [199] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).
46
Ibid 255 [287], 257 [295], 257 [297]; cf at 186 [9], 188 [14] (Gleeson J).
47
Ibid 259 [300].
48
Ibid 257-8 [298], where he states that the legislation 'offers no realistic threat to any freedom
of communication about federal political, or governmental affairs. It is no burden upon it. I
would hold this to be so regardless of the guarded concession made by the respondents
and which I would reject in any event' (footnote omitted).
49
Ibid 259 [299].
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determined on the basis of the concession that the legislation burdened the freedom
but that this issue returned, albeit 'in another guise' when addressing the second stage
of the Lange test.50 At first Heydon J seemed to accept that 'some communications on
government and political matters are insulting'51 and that the legislation may burden
the freedom, although any such burden would be 'very slight'.52 However, he went on
to suggest that insulting words are detrimental 'to the exchange of useful
communications',53 characterised such words as neither information, opinions nor
argument relevant to political communication and concluded that '[t]o address
insulting words to persons in a public place is conduct sufficiently alien to the virtues
of free and informed debate on which the constitutional freedom rests that it falls
outside of it.'54
The subject of Coleman's insulting words was the activities of certain Queensland
police officers. A majority concluded that discussion of the behaviour of such officers
could constitute relevant communication for the purpose of the implied freedom.
McHugh J stated that the freedom includes discussion regarding the Executive, in this
case including the State police force.55 Gummow and Hayne JJ stated that:
Given the extent to which law enforcement and policing in Australia depends both
practically, and structurally … upon close cooperation of federal, state and territory police
forces, there is evident strength in the proposition that an allegation that a state police
officer is corrupt might concern a government or political matter that affects the people of
Australia.56

Kirby J took a similar approach, considering that financial dependence and integration
as mentioned in Lange, 'even communications that principally, or substantially, concern
state governmental or political issues (such as the alleged corruption of state police)'
could constitute relevant communications.57 The Chief Justice, Callinan J and
Heydon J58 did not address this issue.
The freedom affecting State legislation
A threshold issue of whether State legislation is subject to the implied freedom was
conceded by the parties. McHugh J supported that concession59 on the basis that the
States’ powers had been withdrawn by ss 106 and 107 of the Constitution, not only with
respect to powers explicitly given to the Commonwealth as exclusive powers, but also
in relation to:
powers which would entrench on the zone of immunity conferred by … the implied
freedom of communication on political and governmental matters. … The constitutional
immunity is the leading provision; the sections conferring powers on the federal, state
and territory legislatures are subordinate provisions that must give way to the
constitutional immunity. To the extent that the exercise of legislative or executive powers,
_____________________________________________________________________________________
50
Ibid 264 [319].
51
Ibid 268 [330].
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid 269 [332].
55
Ibid 203 [80].
56
Ibid 230 [197], referring to Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 571.
57
Coleman (2004) 209 ALR 182, 239 [229].
58
Ibid 264 [319] (Heydon J). See also at 264 [317], fn 324 (Heydon J).
59
Ibid 202 [76].
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conferred or saved by the Constitution, interferes with the effective operation of the
freedom, the exercise of those powers is invalid.60

Gummow and Hayne JJ agreed61 and Kirby J seems implicitly to have accepted that
State legislation is vulnerable to the Lange implication.62 The Chief Justice and
Heydon J took a more neutral approach.63 Callinan J did not address this issue. Instead
he seems to have focused on a requirement that a burden on the freedom must be in
relation to 'federal institutions, elections or referenda',64 which he stated was not
satisfied on the facts.
The standard of review
In Coleman, there was a great deal of discussion with respect to the standard of review
to be applied in determining when a law infringed the freedom. In general, the Lange
test seems to have survived, but with a slight textual amendment. The debate between
whether to adopt the phrase 'reasonably appropriate and adapted' or a test of
'proportionality' continued and the two-tiered test from earlier cases was adopted by
some members of the Court.
A majority showed support for a slight rewording of the second stage of the Lange
test. That rewording is to the effect that it becomes:
is the law reasonably appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end in a manner
which is compatible with the maintenance of the constitutionally prescribed system of
representative and responsible government.65

This change from 'the fulfilment of which' to 'in a manner which' seems merely to
confirm that the test includes a consideration of the means by which a legislative policy
is put into effect, which could be found in the previous incarnation in any event.
Perhaps more telling is the rejection, by the same majority, of the submission of the
Attorneys-General of the Commonwealth and New South Wales that the second stage
of the Lange test 'should be weakened by requiring only that the law in question be
"reasonably capable of being seen as appropriate and adapted."'66 This suggests that
the Court is asserting its supervisory role over governmental action which may
infringe the freedom.
In addition to the slight rewording of the Lange test, Gleeson CJ and Heydon J (both
in the minority) seem to have supported a standard of review that requires different
levels of scrutiny of the law in question, depending on whether the restriction of
relevant communication is merely an incidental effect of the law or the purpose of the
law. This two-tiered approach harks back to the earlier free speech cases such as
_____________________________________________________________________________________
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Nationwide News.67 Even after the unanimous decision in Lange, Gaudron J maintained
the distinction between the two types of laws in Kruger68 and Levy.69
Gleeson CJ agreed with that approach, to the extent that he agreed with the
standard of scrutiny as it applies to laws which only incidentally restrict political
communication.70 Heydon J agreed that where the impugned law is related to a subject
other than the restriction of political communication and its effect on such
communication 'is unrelated to their nature as political communications',71 it is easier
to justify than 'a law that directly restricts or burdens a characteristic of the
constitutional freedom.'72 In adding to this distinction between content-specific
prohibitions and incidental prohibitions, Heydon J supported statements in earlier
cases that 'a law curtailing political discussion may be valid if it operates in an area in
which discussion has traditionally been curtailed in the public interest, or as part of the
general law.'73
In contrast to the preference of other justices, McHugh J rejected the need to give
the freedom special weight in certain circumstances, focusing instead on the general
notion of compatibility:
The question is … whether the federal, state or territory power is so framed that it
impairs or tends to impair the effective operation of the constitutional system ... by
impermissibly burdening communications on political or governmental matters. In all
but exceptional cases, a law will not burden such communications unless, by its
operation or practical effect, it directly and not remotely restricts or limits the content of
those communications or the time, place, manner or conditions of their occurrence. And a
law will not impermissibly burden those communications unless its object and the
manner of achieving it is incompatible with the maintenance of the system of
representative and responsible government established by the Constitution.74

The notion of compatibility is a convenient link to the broader issue of the formula
to be adopted with respect to the standard of review — whether 'reasonably
appropriate and adapted' or 'proportionality'74 is to be preferred. In Coleman the
parties conceded that Lange is the applicable law, and the 'argument … proceeded
upon the common assumption that … a test of "reasonably appropriate and adapted"
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was to be applied.'75 However, this common assumption did not prevent lengthy
passages in the judgments with respect to it.
McHugh J engaged in a sustained discussion of the standard of review to be
applied in relation to the implied freedom but seems to have concluded that the Lange
test stands.76 This seems to have occurred in the context of McHugh J confirming his
general views with respect to the nature of the freedom and in response to Stone's
criticisms.77 Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ seem to have impliedly accepted the
'reasonably appropriate and adapted' standard,78 Heydon J adding that this does not
call for a conclusion that 'the law is the sole or best means of achieving that end.'79
Callinan J proposed an alternative phrase: 'is the law a reasonable implementation of a
legitimate object',80 although this does not seem different in substance. In contrast,
Kirby J was very critical of the phrase 'reasonably appropriate and adapted', preferring
the notion of 'proportionality'.81 The main reason for this seems to be an aversion to
the term 'appropriate', which may suggest that the Court is imposing its view of the
merits of the impugned legislation beyond the more limited exercise of determining
the validity of the law.82
All the justices analysed some kind of 'fit' between the impugned law and the
maintenance of the constitutional system at issue. However, the formulation of that
test is no longer unanimous. In the end, perhaps this is inconsequential, as the decision
will always be a matter of judgment, regardless of how the test of compatibility is
framed.
Coleman provided the Court with an opportunity to delve into the Lange test.
Unfortunately, the concession made by the parties and the statutory interpretation
route taken by some of the members of the Court prevented authoritative development
of the Lange principles. Nevertheless, the case gives rise to some interesting discussion
with respect to the scope of the freedom.

III

MULHOLLAND

Background
The case of Mulholland concerned the validity of Commonwealth electoral legislation. It
is a case where the Court was unanimous in the ultimate conclusion but six separate
judgments were published. Mulholland, the registered officer of the Democratic Labor
Party ('DLP'), challenged the validity of aspects of Part XI of the Commonwealth Electoral
Act 1918 (Cth).83 The relevant sections create a system of registration of political
parties, with consequential benefits including having the party name placed 'above the
line' on Senate ballot papers, advantages with respect to electoral funding and access to
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relevant electronic electoral rolls.84 The legislation also creates limitations on that
registration. There were two specific limitations at the heart of Mulholland's challenge
— the '500 rule' and the 'no-overlap' rule. The 500 rule requires a political party to have
a minimum of 500 members in order to be a registered party, if the party does not have
a representative in Parliament. Parties could be required to provide that list of
members to the Australian Electoral Commission. The no-overlap rule was a
requirement that no member could be a concurrent member of any other registered
political party.
The Australian Electoral Commission had requested the list of members from the
DLP, which Mulholland, as the registered officer, refused to provide (presumably
because the DLP did not have sufficient members to satisfy the registration
requirements). In circumstances where a federal election was imminent, Mulholland
challenged the legislation, presumably to protect the DLP's place on ballot papers.
Parts of the Act were challenged on a number of grounds, including that: the
legislation was not supported by a legislative head of power; the legislation
contravened ss 7 and 24 of the Constitution by imposing unreasonable discrimination
on some political parties and not allowing a 'direct' choice by the people; and the
legislation infringed a purported constitutional freedom of association for political
purposes and a right of privacy in relation to such an association. Mulholland is
therefore a case that touches on many areas of constitutional law. However, this article
addresses only the remaining issue — the implied freedom of political communication
argument.
Mulholland argued that the restrictions imposed by the 500 rule and the no-overlap
rule burdened the constitutional freedom of communication by restricting which
parties could be registered and therefore be able to have their candidates' party
affiliation appear 'above the line' on Senate ballot papers. Mulholland's application
failed in the Federal Court, before the Full Court of that Court, and in the High Court.
Unlike Coleman, no broad concession was made in Mulholland with respect to the
operation of the Lange test to the facts. In addressing the implied freedom argument,
the Court's discussion is relevant to the scope of the freedom, the standard of review
and the notion of burden.
Scope of the freedom — the ballot paper
In Mulholland, the communication at issue was the identification of a candidate with
their political party 'above the line' on Senate ballot papers. The Chief Justice
concluded that such party affiliation is, in a 'substantial, practical sense' a
communication for the benefit of candidates.85 He looked to the importance of political
parties in the practice of government in Australia and concluded that:
It is proper, and realistic, to regard the information conveyed to electors by the
[Australian Electoral] commission as involving a communication by the party and its
candidates, as well as a communication by the commission. It is a communication about a
matter that is central to the competitive process involved in an election and therefore falls
within the first limb of Lange.86
_____________________________________________________________________________________
84
See, eg, ss 91(1), 91(7), 91AA.
85
Mulholland (2004) 209 ALR 582, 591 [28].
86
Ibid 592 [30].

14
Federal Law Review
Volume 33
____________________________________________________________________________________

McHugh J regarded it as a relevant communication, that is, 'political' in a
constitutional sense, but for slightly different reasons. He considered that the scope of
relevant communications includes 'communications between the executive
government and the people', as these are 'as necessary to the effective working of
[representative and responsible government] as communications between the people
and their elected representatives.'87 In this case, the 'executive' was the Australian
Electoral Commission. McHugh J also looked to the importance of political parties,88
seeming to characterise the communication in two ways: 'The primary purpose of a
ballot-paper … is to record the voter's preferences … It is part of a process … which is
the end to which the Constitution's implication … is directed.'89 In addition, the ballotpaper is the record of communications between candidates and the Commission,
regarding party affiliation, and is therefore (albeit indirectly) a 'communication on
political and government matters between candidates and electors.'90 Kirby J agreed
with McHugh J's analysis.91
Heydon J disagreed, adopting a more limited definition of what constitutes relevant
communication. He relied on a phrase in Lange, identifying relevant communication as
'communications between the electors and the elected representatives, the electors and
the candidates, and the electors themselves'.92 This may be common ground between
the justices. However, Heydon J then continued: 'What is on the ballot paper is a
communication only between the executive government and the electors'93 and a
relevant communication must be of a nature that is 'part of the process of
communicating information with a view to influencing electors to vote for one
candidate or another',94 which he concluded was not the case on the facts. Gummow,
Hayne and Callinan JJ did not address this issue, as they concluded that the 'threshold'
question of establishing a burden on the freedom (the first limb of the Lange test) was
not satisfied.95
The standard of review — Coleman confirmed
In Mulholland, most of the justices found that the legislation did not relevantly burden
the freedom and therefore they did not address the second step in the Lange test.96
Nevertheless, the Chief Justice and Kirby J referred to the standard of review and
generally confirmed their comments made in Coleman. Kirby J reaffirmed his
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opposition to the phrase 'reasonably capable of being regarded by the Parliament as
appropriate and adapted', which was urged by the respondents.97 The idea of a twotiered standard of review, whereby a different degree of scrutiny is applied depending
on the purpose of the law in question, was approved of by the Chief Justice.98 Kirby J
questioned whether such a distinction is helpful, but stated:
it is probably true to say that, in certain circumstances [including when the power is
directed against unpopular minorities or where lawmakers pursue their own partisan
advantage], courts have a heightened vigilance towards the potential abuse of the
lawmaking power inimical to the rule of law. … This is the result of applying a
constitutional standard that assumes no preference for incumbents or any other particular
political interest and postulates (at least in general terms) a 'level playing field' for
competing candidates and political parties offering their ideas, policies and programmes
to the electors.99

The Chief Justice discussed the meanings of 'proportionality' and 'reasonably
appropriate and adapted', concluding that he had 'no objection' to the use of either
term,100 while Kirby J maintained his criticism of the latter phrase.101 Kirby J continued
his search for 'an explanation of constitutional connection that is clearer and more
informative' than the variations of 'reasonably appropriate and adapted',102 focusing
on 'considerations of substance rather than form' and stating that he is influenced by
'universal human rights as they express democratic ideals'.103 Kirby J reiterated his
preference for a test of 'proportionality', applying it in the context of both
characterisation and limitations on legislative power.104
What does it mean to burden the freedom?
A majority105 concluded that Mulholland had failed the first limb of the Lange test by
failing to convince the Court that the legislation burdened the freedom. The essence of
their reasoning focused on their finding that he had not established a pre-existing right
to communicate which was burdened by the impugned legislation.
McHugh J argued that as there is no independent right of communication through a
ballot paper, apart from the legislative entitlement under the Commonwealth Electoral
Act 1918 (Cth), which has connected to it the inherent restrictions (namely the 500 rule
and no-overlap rule), the legislation does not burden the communication.106 The crux
of this argument seems to be that the restriction must be divorced from the law that
creates the right of communication: 'Proof of a burden on the implied constitutional
freedom requires proof that the challenged law burdens a freedom that exists
independently of that law.'107 Gummow and Hayne JJ found that no 'common law
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right' exists granting the DLP a right to have their name on the ballot paper.108
Therefore, considering the 'existence and nature of the "freedom" asserted by the
appellant … it is unnecessary to take any further the matters which arise under
Lange.'109
Callinan J addressed this issue in a slightly different way. He focused on the
specific idea that the appellant had to identify a
constitutional right to have his party affiliation included on the ballot paper. ... As the
appellant has no relevant right to the imposition of an obligation upon another, to
communicate a particular matter, he has no right which is capable of being burdened. The
appellant is seeking a privilege, not to vindicate or avail himself of a right. 110

Heydon J generally agreed with this analysis. He stated that there is no burden because
there is no 'relevant "right or privilege … under the general law" to be interfered
with.'111 The appellant had conceded that a prohibition on any party affiliations being
placed on ballot papers would be valid and therefore '[i]t follows that to legislate for a
mixture of permissions and prohibitions, so as to permit the party affiliations of some
candidates but not others to appear on the ballot paper, cannot interfere with the
implied freedom.' Heydon J stated that it would be 'paradoxical' if a complete
prohibition were valid but a partial one invalid and if an implied freedom created an
obligation to publicise.112
This raises the question of what 'rights' will satisfy the requirement. The appellant
raised the case of ACTV in support of its argument that the freedom was burdened by
the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth). ACTV concerned a challenge to the validity
of Part IIID of the Political Broadcasters and Political Disclosures Act 1991 (Cth), which
prohibited political advertising during election periods113 unless regulations were
made to allow certain restricted advertising.114 A majority in that case held that Part
IIID of the Act was invalid because it infringed the constitutional freedom of political
discussion. The analogy sought to be drawn between ACTV and Mulholland was
rejected by McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ. Their reasons for doing so shed
some light on the pre-existing right argument.
McHugh J found that in ACTV the Act burdened prior statutory rights to broadcast
which existed under the Broadcasting Act 1942 (Cth) and Radiocommunications Act 1983
(Cth), that '[t]he [Act] operated to burden long-existing rights that existed
independently of that Act. The case is not a relevant analogue with the present case.'115
Gummow and Hayne JJ also found the reliance on ACTV was 'misplaced' because the
Act in that case 'restricted what otherwise was the freedom under the common law to
transmit broadcasting and television programmes to the general public and to erect,
maintain and use the necessary equipment'.116 Further, they sought to clarify what was
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the relevant restriction in ACTV, namely, the 'broadcasters' freedom to broadcast',117
rather than any general freedom 'enjoyed by citizens to discuss public and political
affairs and to criticise federal institutions' mentioned by Mason CJ in ACTV.118
Heydon J also found there to be 'no analogy' between the legislation in ACTV and that
in Mulholland because the legislation in ACTV was:
a prohibition on a traditional category of political communications being conducted
through ordinarily available media. It thus burdened an ordinary mode of communication
in such a way as seriously to impede discussion about elections. This is quite distinct from
the enactment of a statutory scheme regulating the content of the official ballot paper. 119

In contrast to the other justices, Kirby J questioned the dichotomy between the
'freedom of communication' and an 'obligation to publicise'.120 He disagreed with the
analysis of Gummow and Hayne JJ regarding the distinction,121 arguing instead that
what was being sought by Mulholland was the invalidation of legislation which
contravened the 'constitutional prescription', not the granting of special benefits.122
With respect to the issue of a pre-existing right, Kirby J stated that the approach of the
majority, if taken to extremes, could 'effectively neuter the implied freedom of
communication … The common law adapts to the Constitution. Where necessary, the
common law would, in my opinion, afford remedies designed to uphold such an
important constitutional protection.'123
In Mulholland, the Court addressed many issues relevant to constitutional law. With
respect to the implied freedom of political communication, the Court confirmed the
principles in Lange. Significantly, it forestalled analysis of the second limb of the Lange
test through its interpretation of what constitutes a relevant burden.

IV

SOME COMMENTARY

This section provides some commentary on the two cases of Coleman and Mulholland.
The issues discussed are the institutional focus of the implication, the way in which the
justices have approached the task of determining what is relevant to the operation of
the constitutionally-prescribed system of government, and the requirement of a preexisting right to communicate before a relevant burden on the freedom can exist.
Institutional focus and judicial review
Coleman (albeit through a concession regarding the application of Lange) and
Mulholland have confirmed that the implied freedom of communication has an
institutional focus and foundation. By this I mean that the implied freedom exists in
order to ensure the effective operation of constitutional structures, rather than because
of an explicit concern for individuals' rights or freedoms — these are merely inevitable
by-products of the Lange implication. In Coleman, the institutional focus was described
thus by McHugh J:
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If the system is to operate effectively, however, of necessity it must be free from laws
whose burdens interfere or have a tendency to interfere with its effectiveness. Thus, it is a
necessary implication of the system that no legislature or government within the
federation can act in a way that interferes with the effective operation of that system. But
since the implication arises by necessity, it has effect only to the extent that it is necessary
to effectively maintain the system of representative and responsible government that
gives rise to it.124

The questions which will therefore lie underneath any case concerning the
implication are: 'what is the system' and what is 'necessary' to ensure the effective
maintenance of that system? Further, a significant issue in this area of law is how the
Court answers those questions. A couple of preliminary observations can be made here
with respect to the Court's reasoning in Coleman and Mulholland. The Court has
confirmed that the institution to be protected is the system of representative and
responsible government established by the Constitution. In Mulholland, the Court went
into some detail regarding the system of government established by the Constitution,
due to the other arguments raised in the case.125 In doing so, the consistent message
was that the Parliament has significant power to determine the detail of the political
systems and institutions in place as part of representative and responsible government.
The phrase 'until the Parliament otherwise provides' throughout the Constitution
confirms this approach, as well as the lack of specific references to the system of
government in the text.
This power of the Parliament affects the role of the Court in adjudicating with
respect to the system of government. However, none of the justices challenged the
ability of the Court to exercise some kind of supervisory role over governmental
action. In Mulholland the Court acknowledged that there are 'certain fundamental
requirements'126 or 'an irreducible minimum content'127 of the system against which
they will judge governmental action. These requirements were not fully explained.
In relation to the exercise of the Court's supervisory role, a focus on the text of the
Constitution has been confirmed, with McHugh J being the most vocal member of the
Court in this regard. In both Coleman and Mulholland McHugh J maintained his
position that the text and structure of the Constitution is the font of the freedom and
that no resort should be made to 'political or other theories external to the
Constitution.'128 It seems almost axiomatic that any act of interpretation must involve
some kind of theory, if only a theory of interpretation itself. This is acknowledged by
McHugh J.129 While theories of interpretation may be excluded from this prohibition,
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political principles or theories are not. The rejection of any such theoretical influences
has been subject to much criticism.130 One critic goes so far as to argue that reference to
material outside the text of the Constitution may be 'required by the very nature of the
concepts within the Constitution' and that in doing so one may 'claim fidelity to the
Constitution.'131 In Coleman, McHugh J outlined some of the criticisms made by Stone,
another critic, enticing readers of the judgment to read on to see a resolution of the
debate. Unfortunately, he does not counter the criticisms but merely restates his
position without explanation, that the 'matters [raised in the criticism] show that … the
text and structure of the Constitution enable the court to determine whether the
freedom has been infringed without resort to political or other theories external to the
Constitution.'132
Coverage and protection133 of political communication
Criticisms of this text-based approach are essentially about the method of judicial
review to be adopted with respect to the implied freedom. Here I continue the analysis
of that method by considering how the Court addressed the scope of relevant
communication for the purpose of the freedom. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Court
did not speak with one voice in its approach to what is relevant communication.
Most of the judges seem to have accepted the two-stage approach of the Lange test.
First, determine whether the law burdens the freedom and in doing so, address what is
relevantly 'political' in a constitutional sense to determine the coverage of the freedom.
Then, address whether the burden is justified by considering what is 'necessary' for the
constitutional system of government to determine the amount of protection granted by
the freedom. However, as noted below,134 any clear separation between the two may
be collapsing in the analysis of some members of the Court.
At both stages of this analysis the justices have revealed what they consider to be
important elements of the constitutional system of government. Some members of the
Court focused on the reality of politics and others emphasise what they believe the
political system should look like. In Mulholland, Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Kirby JJ
referred to the importance of political parties in Australian political practice in order to
conclude that party affiliation on ballot papers is relevant communication and
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therefore covered by the freedom.135 Considering the rationale of the freedom, these
references could be taken to mean that those justices assume the constitutional
legitimacy of political parties within that system. The freedom covers communication
that is relevantly political in a constitutional sense, that is, connected to the system of
representative and responsible government. If political party affiliation is included in
its scope, political parties must be a legitimate part of the system. By the members of
the Court relying on 'reality' to support this argument, the status quo is seen to be a
relevant touchstone of what is constitutional government.
By contrast, in Coleman, Callinan and Heydon JJ reached their ultimate conclusion
by focusing on the civility of discourse as an important part of political debate. In this
instance, these justices painted a picture of the system of government as they believe it
should exist, or as they believe it would most effectively operate, and use that ideal as
the measure for what communication will be protected by the freedom. Callinan J
seems to have argued that insulting language is not relevantly political. Heydon J did
not do so explicitly, but hinted in that direction. Whether these justices limit the
freedom's operation on the basis of coverage or protection, they both appear to be
incorporating an aspiration for reasonable, civil communication within the
constitutional system of government.
Critiquing the pre-existing right argument
In my view, the reasoning in Mulholland with respect to the need for a pre-existing
right to communicate before a law will relevantly burden the freedom of political
communication raises the most significant issues with respect to the 'existence and
nature of the "freedom"'.136 In Mulholland, a majority avoided addressing the second
limb of the Lange test by concluding that, as Mulholland did not identify a right for the
DLP to have its name above the line on the Senate ballot paper that existed
independently of the Act which contained the impugned restrictions on such
publication, there was no burden on the freedom.
The consequence of this argument is that Parliament has the power to create limited
rights of communication, which, if connected to the restrictions to the extent that the
right and the restrictions exist in one piece of legislation, can never be considered as
limitations on freedom of political communication. Seemingly, Parliament can avoid
the implication by only granting limited rights, because the argument turns on
whether the right and the impugned limitations are contained within the same Act.
This approach seems to elevate form over substance rather than assessing the
impact of the restriction on the system of constitutional government, which is at the
heart of the implication. By forestalling the analysis at this threshold, on the basis that
no separate right was identified, it is conceivable that the system may be detrimentally
affected without the ability of the courts to protect it. Consider the following extreme
hypothetical example. In the future, the predominant form of communication
regarding political issues prior to elections becomes internet chat sites. The
government somehow controls access to all chat sites. It allows communication
through those chat sites by requiring users to obtain a licence under the Chat Sites Act
_____________________________________________________________________________________
135 However, it should be remembered that they concluded that it is not protected in the
circumstances because the legislation restricting the communication satisfies the second
stage of the Lange test.
136 Mulholland (2004) 209 ALR 582, 634 [192] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).
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2030 (Cth). The licence fee is $100,000. As that restriction is established within the Act
that provides the right to communicate on the chat sites, the implied freedom is not
burdened unless a separate right to communicate is found outside the Act. Following
the logic of the reasoning in Mulholland, this holds true regardless of the practical
detrimental effect on political communication prior to federal elections. This is because
the 'threshold' is not passed, so the second limb of the Lange test, that of compatibility
between the restriction and the system of government, is not reached.
Another issue to explore with respect to this part of the reasoning in Mulholland is
what kind of legal rule qualifies as a ' pre-existing right'. A variety of terms are used by
members of the Court: 'freedom', 'common law right', 'constitutional right or right to
the imposition of an obligation upon another', 'right or privilege … under the general
law'.137 It is not clear whether the judges mean different things. It also produces an
interesting comparison with Coleman, where there appeared to be a consensus as to the
existence of a common law right or freedom with respect to free speech. This was not
referred to in Mulholland, perhaps because the argument took place and orders were
made in that case prior to the judgment in Coleman.138 It may be argued that if there is
a fundamental right of free speech at common law (as is suggested at least by some of
the Court in Coleman), this could constitute a relevant 'pre-existing right'. If not, is that
because the common law rules are not truly characterised as rights, or because the prerequisite right must be quite specific, to allow the particular form or content of
communication that is burdened by the challenged law?
The division between Kirby J and most of the other justices on the basis of this preexisting right argument seems to reflect a broader disagreement with respect to what
constitutes a relevant burden and what 'freedom' means in this context. The difference
can be characterised as a distinction between a 'pure' burden and a 'relevant' burden.
The majority on this point seem to be aligned with McHugh J's analysis, that the
'freedom' at issue does not mean an absolute freedom from all regulation or restraint,
but a freedom from a relevant type of burden. This conclusion is reached by defining
some regulation as beneficial for the operation of the system of government and
therefore not a relevant burden.139 In contrast, Kirby J took a more absolute view. If
communication is burdened in any way, that restriction is a relevant burden, with the
legitimacy of that burden being a separate issue.140 The distinction between the two
approaches suggests that the majority have, to some extent, collapsed the two stages in
_____________________________________________________________________________________
137 The combination of these phrases brings to mind Hohfeld's analysis of legal rights as set
out by Waldron in Jeremy Waldron (ed), Theories of Rights (1984) 6–7. Waldron outlines the
way in which Hohfeld characterised legal rights as privileges, claim rights, powers and
immunities, with each label bearing a different meaning.
138 The orders in Mulholland were delivered on 20 May 2004 but the reasons were not
published until 8 September 2004, with the reasons in Coleman having been published on 1
September 2004. Nor was the 'pre-existing right' argument raised in Coleman, presumably
because of the concessions made by the parties.
139 Coleman (2004) 209 ALR 182, 208-9 [97] (McHugh J); Mulholland (2004) 209 ALR 582, 601
[66], 602–3 [69]–[70], 611 [97]–[98] (McHugh J). See also Coleman (2004) 209 ALR 182, 265
[323] (Heydon J) and Mulholland (2004) 209 ALR 582, 595 [41] (Gleeson CJ).
140 Coleman (2004) 209 ALR 182, 239 [230], 239 [232]. The Chief Justice did not explicitly
address the pre-existing right argument. However, his analysis in Mulholland suggests that
he may be more in line with Kirby J's approach on this issue than the remainder of the
Court.
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the Lange test by incorporating an evaluation of compatibility with the system of
government in determining the character of any alleged 'burden', rather than
addressing whether the freedom is burdened and the legitimacy of that burden as
sequential and separate questions.141

V

CONCLUSION

Coleman and Mulholland are the latest additions to the developing law of implied free
speech under the Constitution. Perhaps unsurprisingly, they provide neither a
unanimous position, nor a clarification of all aspects of this area of law. What they do
provide is a glimpse of the attitudes of the Court as at 2004 and confirmation of some
of the basics of the Lange principles. It remains the case that the implied freedom of
political communication is not a free-standing boundless freedom of speech,
enforceable by all to protect general speech, but is a limited immunity from some
government action. By contrast, in Coleman, the Court identified a very broad
'fundamental' common law right or freedom of speech. The constitutional freedom is
intrinsically connected only to that which is determined to be necessary for the
maintenance of the constitutional institutions known as representative and responsible
government. Individual rights are not the focus of the implied freedom, yet the Court
must consider specific factual circumstances of individuals in order to determine the
implied freedom cases brought before the Court.
In determining what is necessary for the maintenance of the constitutional system
of government, different methods of analysis and different versions of what that
system contains are vying for ascendancy. On the one hand, some justices are
concerned with civility and the effective operation of a system that fits an ideal. On the
other, some justices seem to be trying to protect what they perceive to be the status quo
by emphasising the practice or reality of politics in Australia. Neither approach is
without its faults. No clear standard of review emerges other than what could be called
a collection of approaches that all look to whether there is a 'fit' between the law and a
legitimate objective.
These cases show the Court to be eager to avoid the constitutional issue, or at least
avoid a full analysis of the Lange test. In Coleman, the Court made statutory
interpretation the primary legal act, perhaps influenced by the Constitution, followed
by constitutional analysis only if an answer is not reached by interpretation alone. In
Mulholland, a majority applied a threshold requirement of a pre-existing right to
communicate before a law can burden the freedom. This requirement raises a number
of issues, left to be resolved in future cases.

_____________________________________________________________________________________
141 I acknowledge that this conclusion of a collapsing of the two stages of the Lange test may
appear to sit uneasily with the suggestion above that the pre-existing right requirement
forestalls the analysis in the second step of that test. It may be that the majority's view of
the nature of the implied freedom has led to the requirement of the pre-existing right,
which must be satisfied as a step antecedent to the analysis of any impugned restriction in
accordance with this notion of being a relevant burden rather than being any mere
restriction on communication.

